In the first part of this series,
Introduction
The collapse of the global financial markets in 2008 and the following recession has given us a unique opportunity to think about the efficiency of our current economic system. As I have shown in the first part of this series [1] , a careful analysis of the system-related causes of the crisis reveals a fundamental conflict between the private banks and society. Private banks (non-government owned banks) can increase their profits by creating more and more money through borrowers default. Bank runs again have a very negative impact on society. If the private banks are bailed out, then the taxpayers have to pay for the risk-seeking behavior of bankers. Or if the government lets the private banks fail, then a sudden credit crunch could lead to a serious recession in the real economy.
Two theories explain how the private banks create money. The money multiplier model emphasizes that private banks have to wait until customers deposit their money in order to use those deposits to make loans. The money supply is controlled by the central bank through reserve requirements. However, private banks can circumvent those regulations entirely through securitization. The second theory is the endogenous money theory, which claims that private banks do not need to wait for customers to deposit their money. The accounting rules of double-entry bookkeeping allow the banks to create loans (as an asset) by counter-balancing it with fictitious deposits in the name of the borrowers (as a liability). Here, the money supply is endogenously determined by the demand for credit and is not anymore under the direct control of the central bank. The endogenous money theory is clearly a much more accurate description of reality.
However, for a policy discussion, it is important to keep both models in mind. A proposal with would only prohibit private money creation as described in the endogenous money theory would not solve the problem, because private banks could still take excessive risks in the money multiplier model through securitization. Any real solution to the problem would have to either close the loopholes or prohibit also private money creation as described in the money multiplier model.
As I have shown in the first part [1] , conventional reforms of the banking system are very unlikely going to solve the interest conflict between private banks and society, because the private banks would always find ways to evade regulations. Therefore, it becomes reasonable to consider some unconventional (and more radical) options. Instead of allowing the private banks to create money through fractional reserve banking, it could be argued that the ability to create money should be a state monopoly (cf. [2] , pp. 358-359). If a normal citizen tried to create (counterfeits) money, he/she would go to prison. Why then do we allow private banks to create over 97% of our money out of thin air ( [3] , p. 369)?
One argument could be that we give private banks this extraordinary privilege to create money, because they fulfil an important function in the economy. However, the too-big-to-fail banks are not fulfilling their functions for the economy.
They do not transfer the money from the depositors to the businesses who want to invest, because it is much more profitable for them to speculate with the depositors' money ( [4] , p. 6). And they have strong incentives to create bubbles, because a bubble fuels the demand of debts, which again allows a higher leverage of private banks. Investors are more willing to finance their investment with debt, if prices (e.g. the value of a house) compared to the costs of borrowing the money increases faster, because they could always sell their investment with [4] , p. 7) nor price stability (cf. [2] , p. 361; [5] , p. 4). But if the current banking system is not fulfilling their core functions for the economy, why should we accept the risks they are creating for the whole society?
In the following, I will discuss the Chicago Plan, the Sovereign Money approach, and the Modern Money Theory. And finally, I will propose a synthesis of these three approaches, which would indeed much better solve major problems of our current economic system: growth, employment, and price stability.
Chicago Plan
The Chicago Plan was developed as a response to the Great Depression during The basic idea was to allow the credit investment trusts to continue to create credit, but purely as intermediaries: "first obtaining funds and subsequently lending these out" ( [7] , p. 7; cf. [14] , p. 34). However, in regard to the exact organization of bank lending those proposals differed significantly. On the one hand, Fisher's [10] proposal would give the credit investment trusts the right to finance loans with equity, time (savings) deposits, and funds obtained through the sale of securities. On the other hand, Simons [9] , who was afraid that securities could become a money substitute and therefore allow the credit investment trusts to continue to create money (cf. [15] , p. 210), wanted to limit the money available for loans to the investment trusts' own capital ( [7] , p. 7 [10] or b) equity + treasury credit [14] or c) equity [9] government bonds, short-term and mortgage loans are cancelled against treasury credit [14] Central Bank/Treasury --provision of treasury credit - 
Sovereign Money
The origin of the idea of Sovereign Money can be seen in the economic works of [24] , p. 14)-but it tries to achieve this aim in different ways. The first difference is that no break-up of commercial banks into money banks and credit investment trusts is demanded. The second point is the insight that money in our information age is much more than just cash (e.g.
credit cards), and therefore the Chicago Plan with the requirement for money banks to hold 100 percent reserves in cash seems to be outdated ( [22] , p. 4, 23).
Since money is today mainly information stored in bank accounts, it is much easier to prevent private banks to use their customers' deposits for creating loans by changing accounting rules (cf. [23] , p. 26). The first step is to declare the electronic money in the customers' deposits (most of it was created by the private banks) to be legal tender ( [22] , p. 23f). In a second step the private banks would be required to make a clear distinction between safe transaction accounts with instant access for the customers and investment accounts "where the customer consciously requests their funds to be placed at risk and invested" ( [23] , p.
26). Transaction accounts would not anymore be a liability for the private banks ( [22] , p. 23f). The private banks would keep them only in custody for the customers, "but the money is held off-balance at a central bank database" ( [7] , p.
15). Private banks would be unable to use those transaction accounts for making loans, and therefore the transaction accounts would be risk-free, but unfortunately also not interest-bearing. Customers would have to pay a fee for the service provided by the private banks ( [7] , p. 15; [23] , p. 180; [24] , p. 14).
If customers would want to get interest on their capital, they would need to transfer their money from the safe transaction accounts to investment accounts and from here directly to the banks' investment pool accounts. In this senseand this is important-the investment accounts "will never actually hold any However, my biggest concern about the Positive Money proposal is that it does not achieve its goal to guarantee the government's control over the money supply. Yes, the sovereign money approach rules out money creation by the private banks as it was described by the endogenous money theory. But similar to downplay this problem by arguing that such a "process is unsustainable in the long term." I agree, it is. In the moment the process becomes unsustainable and borrowers default, the bubble will burst with consequences for the real economy.
It would not destroy money, but we can expect that the private bank's customers, who lost their "wealth" in the Investment Accounts will adjust their behavior and cut consumption. This problem becomes more serious, because Jackson and 
Modern Money Theory
The 123; [29] , p. 18). In the chartalist view, "inflation would result, if the relation between government spending and taxing were wrong, not because the ratio of money supply (however measured) and GDP were wrong" ( [29] , p. 9).
The same logic can be applied to unemployment. Involuntary unemployment increases, whenever the additional money supply (government spending minus taxes) is not enough to cover the private sector's additional savings, which in aggregate reduces the money available for productive uses ( [26] , p. 81; [27] , p.
84; [30] , p. 176f). However, the problem is that the government does not know in advance how much the private sector wants to save, and therefore cannot ad- [26] , p. 82). In addition, the ELR fulfills the principle of functional finance, because government spending would float counter cyclically. In times of high unemployment the ELR will increase government spending automatically, whereas in times of full employment the ELR will reduce government spending and inflationary pressures ( [26] , p. 83; [27] , p. 94; [32] , p. 15). However, the ELR would allow the firing of workers, if they would not fulfill the required performance standards ( [27] , p. 125). As a result, we can expect the ELR to be better than unemployment, because "it would prevent deterioration of labor skills, would maintain income at a base level" ( [32] , p. 15), and "should lower recruiting and hiring costs as employers would have an employed pool of workers demonstrating readiness and willingness to work" ( [29] , p. 46f). Workers, who are unwilling or unable to work, would still have to rely on the social safety net ( [27] , p. 125).
Finally, the advocates of the MMT claim that their proposal would be compatible to a free market ideology, because government interventions could be reduced. Neither would there be a need for a minimum wage law, nor would the interest rate need to be adjusted frequently. And since the ELR reacts automatically to the private sector's demand of labor, it is actually the private sector that decides the size of the government's deficit ( [27] , p. 182).
The critics of the MMT have mainly focused on two topics. The first is related to concerns about the applicability of the ELR program in real economies. Critics question whether the government can find sufficient desirable work for all the unemployed workers ( [27] , p. 181) or believe that it would lead to inflation, since those "unproductive" workers in the ELR would earn wages and consume goods, although they do not increase the production of those goods ( [29] , p. 47). Wray ([27] , p. 182) counters the former point by referring to the endless job opportunities in the not-for-profit, volunteer organizations as a way to find desirable work. And the counter-argument to the latter point is that the ELR as well as any other service job does not produce any goods. Should we therefore get rid of all service jobs? According to Tymoigne and Wray ([29] , p. 48) this argument is a red herring.
The second concern of the critics is far more serious. More mainstream post
Keynesians have pointed out that the role of private banks in creating money is not covered well in MMT ( [33] [34], p. 19). This is an important issue, since the MMT emphasizes the view that the government has a monopoly to create money, which however is not the case in reality. It is even more confusing that the MMT makes this argument in the context of post Keynesianism, which believes in its core in the endogenous money theory [35] . also not be applied to an economy that gives the private banks the permission to multiple state money, if the state does not close the loopholes to go beyond the reserve requirements: securitization. Table 3 ).
Synthesis
First of all, considering that we are living in an information age, I agree with the Sovereign Money theorists that it is much easier to change accounting rules than printing a large amount of cash in order to introduce a 100%-reserve requirement. I would follow here largely the Positive Money proposal of Jackson and Dyson (see Table 2 ). Central banks would keep the databases (customer funds, investment pool, etc.), whereas the private banks would hold the Transaction The creation of public banks could also solve another important issue. The prohibition of private banks to make loans by using deposits would very likely reduce the availability of credit in the economy ( [7] , p. 3; [17] , p. 4; [37] , p. 66; [38] , p. 262). In order to avoid negative effects on investments, public banks could fill in and provide credit for the companies that want to create jobs. Public banks would be able to receive unlimited loans from the Central Bank for this purpose. However, they would not be allowed to create money for mortgages or car loans. If somebody wants to borrow money for consumption, he/she would still need to borrow from the private banks (which would have no access to cheap unlimited Central Bank loans). The main advantage of such a system is that it breaks the connection between savings and investments (the available money for investments would be in principle unlimited). Of course, paying interest and repaying loans would reduce the money supply. In order to avoid this outcome, the reduction of the money circulating in the economy would have to be counter-balanced by an equivalent increase of the government budget.
The usual argument against public banks is that they are inefficient compared to the private banks. Well, I would immediately ask how efficiency is measured.
Of course, the proposed public banks would be much less efficient in making a profit. This should not be a surprise, since it would not be their aim to make profit. On the other hand, I am quite sure that those public banks would be much more efficient in supporting the creation of jobs and with this the sustainable growth of the economy than private banks [39] . I would like to mention that this proposed system solves another criticism against the Chicago Plan or the Positive Money proposal. It is often argued that any type of full reserve banking reform would reduce the profits of private banks so much that they would be driven into the unregulated shadow banking sector banking system between the private banks and society as a whole would disappear. As a result this alternative financial system would much more efficiently contribute to economic growth and the reduction of unemployment than the current system. It would much better fulfil the aim of price stability than the current system. Furthermore, the money available for speculation would dry up immediately when private banks would lose the ability to create money. And the establishment of such an alternative financial system would not require international cooperation, because it would make the national public banking sector largely independent from other financial markets.
Conclusions
The focus of the first part of this series [1] was on an analysis of the private banks' current ability to create money. I have shown that independent of the theory, which explains this money creation process (money multiplier theory vs.
the post Keynesian endogenous money theory), issuing of money by private banks leads to a fundamental conflict between the risk-seeking bankers and the risk-averse society. Private banks can increase their profits by extending the money supply through loans. The society on the other hand has an interest to limit the money creation by the private banks, because the excessive issuing of (private) bank money increases the probability of bursting bubbles and bank runs with tremendous negative consequences for the real economy and the taxpayers. Furthermore, I argued that the conventional proposals to reduce the risks of financial crises would fail, because they did not address the cause of the issue: the fundamental conflict between private banks and the society. would not anymore be forced to bail-out failing banks. And all of this could be achieved without strict regulations for private banks.
